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The Impact of Fiscal Limits on Governance
By JOHN J. KIRLIN*
Governments have proven marvelously adaptive under fiscal con-
straints, finding new sources of revenues, elaborating new approaches to
achieving their goals, and occasionally cutting activities and expenditures.
What are the consequences of these adaptations for the governance capac-
ity of our communities? Has the drive to solve fiscal pressures left gov-
emnment less capable to address future challenges? This essay examines
the impact of fiscal constraints upon governance capacity, focusing on
California experiences.1 This is an early report on work in progress. Its
empirical focus is California state and local governments. Cities tran-
sected by Interstate 10 (Santa Monica to Blythe) and Interstate 80 (San
Francisco to Truckee), including forty-seven cities in existence since 1970,
are chosen to illuminate the effects of competition and cooperation among
proximate cities and of economic growth and decay channeled by major
infrastructure. Such analysis will address: (1) creation of new govern-
mental entities, such as Joint Powers Authorities; (2) civic infrastructure
including civic associations, nonprofits, and neighborhood associations;
and (3) evidence of political effects, including regime turnover among city
councils and tenure of city managers.
Fiscal limits became most visible in the United States in the 1970s,
most notably with the 1978 California voter passage of Proposition 13.2
Many analysts of fiscal limits, especially those in Public Administration,
* Professor of Public Administration, University of Southern California. Presented at the
Annual Spring Meeting, National Academy of Public Administration at Durham, North Carolina,
June 6-8, 1997.
1. See Jeffrey I. Chapman & John J. Kirlin, Land Use Consequences of Proposition 13, 53
S. CAL. L. REV. 95 (1979); see also Steven Sheffrin & Terri Sexton, Equity and Efficiency in the
California Tax System, and John J. Kirlin et al., Fiscal Reform in California, in CALIFORNIA
FISCAL REFORM: A PLAN FOR ACTION 26-37, 38-56 (California Business-Higher Education Fo-
rum ed., 1994). See generally JEFFREY I. CHAPMAN, PROPOSITION 13 AND LAND USE: A CASE
STUDY OF FISCAL LIMITS IN CALIFORNIA (1981); JOHN J. KIRUN, THE PoirncAL ECONOMY OF
FIscAL LIMITs (1982); JOHN J. KniRN & ANNE M. KIRuN, PUBLIC CHOICES-PRivATE
RESOURCES: FINANCING CAPITAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR CALIFORNIA'S GROWTH THROUGH
PUBuC-PRiVATE BARGAINING (1982); DAVID 0. SEARS & JACK CTrRIN, TAX REvOLT:
SOMETHING FOR NOTHING IN CALIFORNIA (1982).
2. CAL. CONST. art. XIII A.
[197]
have emphasized impacts on agencies, such as the attention given "cut-
back" management3 or upon programs.
4
Another line of relevant Public Administration research has devel-
oped around the metaphor of a "hollow state," in which government man-
ages networks of non-profits and private firms, instead of relying on public
employees hierarchically organized in public bureaucracies, to deliver
services.5 The interaction of politics and fiscal affairs has been a focus of
a loose international group of scholars, including mostly sociologists and
6political scientists.
A larger, more diffuse issue raised is the impact of fiscal constraints
upon governance of political systems. Governance capacity can be defined
as the ability to make and effectuate collective choices for a geographically
bounded grouping of humans, sustained over time. The "geographical
groupings" of particular interest here are sub-national, for most formal fis-
cal limits operate at the state and regional level. The effects of such limits
upon local governments and other institutions affected by state-level limits
therefore provide the richest available experiences for analysis.
Governance capacity, is more than the capacity of any single govern-
mental agency or of any single government taken as a whole. It is shaped
by: constitutional rules for formation and powers of local governments;
the actual, typically multiple, governments affecting a specific area; sig-
nificant public policies, such as the allocation of fiscal resources among
governments; and the available civic infrastructure, including news media,
civic associations, and neighborhood associations. Further, there is no
well-established overall measure of governance capacity. Robert Putnam
analyzed governmental capacity to act and Jeffrey Berry, Kent Portney and
Ken Thomson analyzed citizens' competencies to participate effectively in
governance of their communities.9 Elements of civic infrastructure have
3. See generally MANAGING FISCAL STRESS (Charles H. Levine ed., 1980); IRENE S.
RUBIN, SHRINKING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: THE EFFECT OF CUTBACKS ON FIVE FEDERAL
AGENCIES (1985).
4. See generally RICHARD P. NATHAN ET AL., THE CONSEQUENCES OF CuTs (1983).
5. See, e.g., H. Brinton Milward, Symposium on the Hollow State: Capacity, Control, and
Performance in Interorganizational Settings, 6 J. OF PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 193, 193-95
(1996).
6. The group has been stimulated and facilitated by Terry Clark. See Terry N. Clark,
Structural Realignments In American City Politics: Less Class, More Race, and a New Political
Culture, 31 URB. AFF. REv. 367 (1996). Emerging from this group are a number of comparative
studies. See generally STRATEGIC CHANGES AND ORGANIZATIONAL REORIENTATIONS IN LOCAL
GOvERNMENT: A CROSS-NATIONAL PERsPECrIvE (Nahum Ben-Ella ed., 1996); LOCAL
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: INCENTIVES AND INTERNATIONAL TRENDS (Norman Walzer ed.,
1995).
7. See John J. Kirlin, The Big Questions of Public Administration in a Democracy, 56
PUB. ADMIN. REv. 416,417-20 (1996).
8. See generally Dean Stansel, Taming Leviathan: Are Tax and Spending Limits the An-
swer?, 213 POLICY ANALYSIS (Sept. 29, 1996) <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-213.html>.
9. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK 63-82 (1993); JEFFREY M.
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been advanced as critical to governance capacity by Peter Berger, Richard
John Neuhaus, the National Civic League and Robert Putnam.1° Finally,
the transaction costs of reaching and implementing collective choices are a
relevant consideration in governance capacity.1 Where there is "good"
governance, the results include a functioning political system with desired
levels of citizenship and political accountability resulting in appropriate
public policies, along with reduced transaction costs of economic activity
12
and increased individual opportunities for rewarding lives.
In California, total own-source revenues available to state and local
governments approached $120 billion annually in 1991-92.13 Revenues
have increased in real terms per capita since passage of the Jarvis-Gann
Initiative in 1978, but the sources of revenues and their distribution among
governments has been altered.' 4 Governments have undeniably undertaken
substantial adaptations in response to fiscal limits, with cities being espe-
cially innovative in developing new revenue sources and new ways to
achieve their goals. Such successful fiscal adaptations may lead to the
conclusion that fiscal limits had modest effect. This conclusion, however,
ignores possible non-fiscal impacts.
Governance capacity changes over time and can be enhanced or
weakened by public policy choices in a manner analogous to the interplay
between institutions and organizations. 5 The total California state and lo-
cal public fisc may indeed be as full as before fiscal limits, but the govern-
ance system of the state has been substantially altered, leaving it with re-
duced capacity to meet future challenges.
Fiscal Limits
This analysis distinguishes four forms of fiscal limits, including re-
ductions and limits in a specific revenue source, limits on total govern-
mental revenues or expenditures, policy choices resulting in reduced fiscal
resources, and rules for decision making that effectively raise the barrier
for increased revenues or expenditures. California offers examples of all
four. Proposition 13 reduced current property taxes and limited future in-
BERRY, THE REBIRTH OF URBAN DEMOCRACY 166-280 (1993).
10. See PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: FROM
STATE TO CrvIL SOCIETY (Michael Novak ed., 2nd ed. 1996); PUTNAM, supra note 9, at 83-120,
163-185.
11. See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INTrUrIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990).
12. See, e.g., Hendrik Spruyt, Institutional Selection in International Relations: State An-
archy as Order, 48 INT'L ORG. 527-57; WORLD BANK, THE STATE IN A CHANGING WORLD:
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 1997 (1997).
13. See Kirlin et al., Fiscal Reform in California, supra note 1, at 46.
14. See id. at 43-46.
15. See generally NORTH, supra note 11. North defines institutions as rules shaping action,
such as property rights, and argues that organizations both are constrained by these rules and seek
to change them to their advantage.
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creases.16 Proposition 4 placed limits on governmental expenditures.
7
The permanent transfer of $3.6 billion of property tax revenues away from
counties, special districts, and cities to the State in the 1992-93 and 1993-
94 legislative sessions reduced city, special district, and county fiscal re-
sources. Finally, Proposition 218 makes increasing revenues more diffi-
cult by requiring voter approval of a variety of taxes, fees and assessments
previously requiring action only by the elected governing board. 19
Fiscal limits are intended to reduce funds available to affected gov-
ernments, but whether they do so and by how much is not clear. Even be-
fore passage of Proposition 13, the expansion of the finances available to
all governments in the United States had slowed.2 When adjusted for
changes in population and prices, total revenues generated by California
governments increased modestly. Own source revenues of all California
governments increased by a total of 11.3 percent in real dollars per capita
between 1977-78 and 1991-92, a compounded rate of 0.8 percent annu-
ally.2' By contrast, Dean Stansel analyzed the expenditures and revenues
of 18 states that had adopted tax and expenditure limitations (TEL) before
1986, measuring the change in their growth rates in the five years immedi-
ately preceding and immediately following adoption of the TEL versus the
national average growth rates. He found that the growth rates were re-
duced in the TEL states, from 7.1 percent (0.8 percent above the national
average) before to 1.8 percent (2.9 percent below the national average) af-
ter TEL adoption.23 Twenty-three states had binding TELs in 1994.'
At least twelve fiscal eras can be distinguished in California since the
end of World War II, including two preceding Proposition 13, providing
the context within which fiscal limits arose. Figure 1 presents these twelve
eras, each defined by actions intended to address perceived problems of
that period,25 including major fiscal actions, typical state government ac-
tions, and typical local government actions.
16. CAL. CONST. art. XIII A.
17. CAL. CONST. art. XIII B.
18. See CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, PROPERTY TAXES: WHY SOME LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS GET MORE THAN OTHERS 11 (1996).
19. An initiative constitutional amendment adopted by voters on November 5, 1996. Propo-
sition 218 was entitled the "Voter Approval for Local Government Taxes. Limitations on Fees,
Assessments and Charges." For an assessment of how Proposition 218 changes local government
finances and governance, see CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, UNDERSTANDING
PROPOSrION 218 6-37 (1996).
20. See generally ANTHONY H. PAsCAL ET AL, RAND CORPORATION, FISCAL
CONTAINMENT OF LOCAL AND STATE GOVERNMENT (1979).
21. See Kirlin et al., Fiscal Reform in California, supra note 1, at 43.
22. See Stansel, supra note 8, at 7-8.
23. See id at 9.
24. See id. ht 7.
25. See Kirlin et al., Fiscal Reform in California, supra note 1, at 41-42.
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Figure 1. Fiscal Eras in California
Time
Frame Fiscal Era Perceived Problem(s) Major Fiscal Actions
1945- The "Golden Era" Need to accommodate growth in Expand governmental
1968 population and economic activity roles, revenues and ex-
penditures
1968- Pressures for Tax Need to address unrest with Continued expansion of
1978 Relief Repelled by property taxes as property prices governments
the State escalate to 50 % above national
average
1978 Proposition 13 Need to address electorate's Pass Jarvis-Gann Initia-
frustration with inability of po- tive: property tax rate of 1(Jarvis-Gann Initia- litical system to control increased %; assessment base at
tive) property tax burden 1975-76 values; limits
change to 2 % year
1978- "Bail-Out" How to survive the first year un- SB 154, allocates remain-
1979 der Proposition 13, which re- ing property tax and state
duced property tax revenues aid in effort to provide 90
nearly $7 billion % funding to local gov-
ernments
1979- Regularizing Ad- How to stabilize state-local fiscal Voters pass Proposition 4
1980 justments and Facing relations; pressure for additional (Gann limit on expendi-
New Fiscal Con- fiscal limits seen in legislature tures) and defeat Proposi-
straints and initiatives tion 9; AB 8 enacted
1980- Confronting Ex- State financial surplus exhausted State-local fiscal relation-
1982 haustion of the State ships regularized in
Surplus budget
1982- Institutionalizing-the How to finance activities histori- Metropolitan county vot-
1988 "New Fiscal System" cally supported by the (now con- ers impose increased sales
strained) public sector, especially taxes for transportation
during a recession; citizens' dis- system improvements
content about impacts of growth (1984 =>); most growth
increasingly visible limit initiatives lose, but
growth dampened
1988 Schools Seek an Ad- Advocates of K-12 education Proposition 98 passes by
vantage (primarily the California Teach- slim majority; guarantee-
ers Association) seek to "lock in" ing K-12 a fixed share of
funding state funding
1989- General Purpose Proposition 98 allocation formu- Proposition 111 passes,
1990 Governments las will inexorably ratchet up increasing gasoline tax
"Rebalance" the Fis- expenditures on K-14, starving and modifying Proposi-
cal System all other activities tion 98 allocation formu-
las
1990- Budgeting by In- Several interests who cannot get Propositions 108, 116 and
1992 itiative desired expenditures through the 117 pass, allocating re-
"ordinary" budget process turn to sources to specific parks
initiatives and recreation and trans-
portation projects
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1991- State Protects its
1993 "Core" Activities
1993 Permanent Increase in
Sales Tax





State is faced with severe short-
falls between revenues and ex-
penditure demands; attacks on
"special taxes" levied by local
governments launched by advo-
cates of fiscal limits
"Temporary" sales tax for 1/2
cent about to expire at a time
when public sector budgets faced
shortfalls
State-local fiscal relationships not
functional (e.g., encourage sales
tax generating land uses; counties
with few incentives to administer
property tax well); Serrano com-
pliance in jeopardy as property
tax revenues rise to wealthy K-12
districts
Proponents of fiscal limits be-
lieve provisions of Proposition 13
and Proposition 4 have been
violated, especially by increased
fees, taxes and assessments made
by elected local officials




tion 172, making the in-
creased sales tax perma-
nent
Governor and LAO pro-
pose competing structural
and fiscal reforms; Gann
and Jarvis organizations
push for actions that
would further limit local
government use of debt
and fees and assessments
Voters approve Proposi-
tion 218, which requires
(a) majority voter ap-
proval to increase general
taxes and reiterates 2/3
voter approval rule for
special taxes, (b) property
owner approval of as-
sessments fees and
charges, and limits (c)
assessments to the special
benefit conferred and (d)
fees and charges to actual
costs, without any impo-
sition resulting in transfer
to general governmental
purposes
Figure 1 indicates that the public sector fiscal system, an important
component of governance of a community, is not a stable foundation upon
which collective choices may be made, policies adopted and programs im-
plemented. Changes occur frequently and in many arenas, with most eras
characterized by changes made through the legislative process, but several
major changes were made through initiatives. The resulting patterns illus-
trate Douglass North's argument that "organizations" or forces contending
over fiscal resources, are constrained by, but also change, "institutions" or
the constitutional menu of available governmental instruments and impor-
tant fiscal powers of governments.
26
Second, Figure 1 reveals efforts to maintain a "balanced" system at
several points, suggesting that there are socially constructed limits within
26. See NORTH, supra note 11, at 73-82.
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which fiscal and other policies are elaborated. When property tax burdens
become onerous, Proposition 13 is enacted; when Jarvis-Gann reduces lo-
cal government property tax revenues, the State uses its surplus funds to
ease the cuts; when limits on traditional public sources of funds imperil fi-
nancing of infrastructure and services .needed to accommodate economic
and population growth, new devices are created to meet these needs; when
Proposition 98 gives K-12 an "excessive" advantage in budgetary alloca-
tions, Proposition 111 is passed to restore a better balance.
Third, Figure 1 shows that the state plays a dominant role in policy
making. The State takes a lead in accommodating growth after World War
II, providing major infrastructure projects and a legal framework condu-
cive to local government activism. When it could not respond to dissatis-
faction about rising property taxes, the state's paralysis fueled the dissatis-
faction that resulted in passage of Proposition 13. When state revenues fell
short of the expenditure demands of its "core" activities in the recession of
the early 1990s, the state shifted property taxes from counties, cities and
special districts to its purposes.
Fourth, while much more information is available about traditional
governmental revenues and expenditures than about other activities to meet
collective needs, such activities are evident and appear to be growing in
importance. Foundation and other gifts to California non-profits are esti-
mated to exceed $1 billion annually, for example, equaling about one-third
what the state expends on AFDC or somewhat less than one-half of what
the state expends on SSIISSP programs annually.27
A major feature of the adjustments made after the passage of Proposi-
tion 13 reduced funds available for infrastructure was to shift these obliga-
tions primarily to the private sector.2 No compilation of the total funding
involved is available, but several indirect measures suggest it was large.
For example, the state no longer funds on and off ramps for freeway proj-
ects, making them the obligation of adjacent property owners and local
governments. Also, the volume of Mello-Roos assessment-backed bonds,
a common device used to fund infrastructure from future users of develop-
ment, totaled $4.4 billion over the 1982-1993 period. In addition, the South
Coast Air Quality Management District shifted costs of moving commuters
out of single person automobiles to private employers through Rule 15,
which required employers of over 100 employees to reduce the numbers of
employees arriving at work as single occupants in cars. The cost per firm
was reported to be up to $2 million annually;29 confronting charges that its
policy had driven employers out of the region, the SCAQMD eventually
suspended this approach to improving air quality.
27. See Kirlin et al., Fiscal Reform in California, supra note 1, at 40.
28. See JOHN J. KIRLIN & ANNEM. KIRuN, supra note 1; Dean J. Misczynski, The Fiscali-
zation of Land Use, in 3 CALIFORNIA POICY CHOICES 73-106 (John J. Kirlin & Donald R. Win-
kler eds, 1986).
29. See Hitting the Carpool Brakes, WALLST. J., January 12, 1994, at A10.
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Impacts on Governance Capacity
The impacts of fiscal limits upon governance can be divided into two
categories, those impacting governmental dynamics directly and those re-
sulting indirectly from adaptations by governments to fiscal limits. In both
categories, the effects of fiscal limits are experienced by governments and
also beyond governments.
Direct Impacts
Three types of direct impacts are seen: (1) reduced revenues (or ex-
penditures), (2) a political culture of fiscal constraint, seen in both citizens
and politicians, and (3) greater restrictions upon future fiscal decisions by
elected bodies and/or the electorate. As discussed above, there is general
agreement that fiscal limits have reduced revenue growth, constraining
governmental capacity to achieve objectives by direct expenditure.3
Citizen surveys in California reveal a political culture that strongly
supports fiscal limits and, beyond just fiscal issues, includes a broad dis-
trust of government.31 A March 1994 telephone survey conducted by
Rund's firm found 56 percent of respondents judging Proposition 13 to be
a "good thing" as opposed to 24 percent judging it to have been a "bad
thing."32 Forty-eight percent of respondents wanted a government that
does less and requires a lower level of taxes "for the future," while 41 per-
cent favored a government that provides a higher level of services even if
that means increased taxes.3 Ninety percent of the respondents believed
the state government wastes money, and 80 percent believed the same
about local governments.3 4 Seventy-two percent did not believe the state
government could be trusted to do what is right and 58 percent similarly
distrusted local governments. Nearly three cuarters wanted a change in
"our whole form of government in California." 6
These survey responses suggest deep dissatisfaction with government
and a strong opinion that government wastes resources, attitudes which
support fiscal limits even when the percentage willing to pay more taxes
for increased services is nearly as large as the percentage hoping for re-
duced government and lowered taxes. The California responses reasona-
30. See generally supra text accompanying notes 8, 20.
31. See Jack Citrin, The Public Landscape for Fiscal Reform in California, and Charles F.
Rund, Survey of Public Opinion on Fiscal Reform in California, in CALIFORNIA FISCAL
REFORM: A PLAN FOR ACTION, supra note 1, at 57-63, 82-92.
32. See Rund, supra note 31, at 91 tbl.8.21.
33. See id. at 88 tbl.8.15.
34. See id. at 86.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 86-87 tbl.8.10.
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bly parallel those elicited in national surveys.37 And, fiscal limits are also
supported by candidates and elected officials, few of whom advocate in-
creased taxes. Indeed, in spring 1997 President Clinton and Congress ne-
gotiated a "balanced budget" in the spirit of fiscal constraint.
An important feature of many fiscal limits is constraint upon future
fiscal choices. Dean Stansel advocates long term restrictions upon fiscal
choices, identifying nine features of tax and expenditure limits which he
believes will result in the most enduring constraints. 38 In California, advo-
cates of fiscal limits have sought to further constrain state and local gov-
ernment, arguing that the state and local governments have "escaped from"
the intended constraints of Proposition 13 and Proposition 4. In November
1996, voters approved Proposition 218, which such advocates drafted and
qualified for the ballot, and which requires voter approval for most future
local government revenue increases (taxes, fees and assessments) and ends
some taxes and fees already adopted by city council or county board of su-
pervisor action unless reauthorized by popular vote.39
In summary, the direct effects of fiscal limits include reductions in
rates of growth in revenues, a constraining political culture, and rules im-
posing tighter constraint on fiscal choices. These are clearly "governance
capacity" effects, where political culture and decision rules constrain fu-
ture governmental choice. Advocates of fiscal constraint celebrate these
results, arguing not only the advantages of less expensive government
(more resources in the private sector and/or a presumption of less "intru-
sive" government) but also the importance of increased accountability of
governmental officials to citizens to whom they must turn for approval of
more governmental actions with fiscal consequences.40
Broadly understood, plebiscites are thus replacing representative gov-
ernment in California, especially for choices having large fiscal impact.
This major governance capacity consequence of fiscal limits goes to the
very nature of the constitutional design of our political system, with citizen
distrust of government and belief in government waste proving fertile
ground for appeals to require voter approval of significant governmental
action.
The impact of fiscal limits also extends to other elements of the gov-
ernance system. By changing the fiscal powers of governments, fiscal
limits have reduced the usefulness of government as an instrument of col-
lective action for a community. Governments have less fiscal capacity and
37. See, e.g., WHY PEOPLE DON'T TRUST GOvERNMENT 77-107, 205-216 (Joseph Nye et
al. eds., 1997).
38. See Stansel, supra note 8, at 22. The features he advocates include constitutional rather
than statutory form, applicable to all expenditures, and applicable to both state and local govern-
ments.
39. See generally CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, supra note 19.
40. See Joel Fox et aL, Argument in Favor of Proposition 218, reprinted in LEAGUE OF
CALIFORNIA CrrIES, PROPOSITION 218 IMPLEMENTATION GuIDE A13 (1997).
less flexibility in allocating available funds. In addition, the cost of using
government to achieve collective ends has increased. This is seen most
visibly in requirements for more elections and associated campaigns on
revenue measures.4
Other instruments of collective action, such as civic associations, non-
profit organizations, neighborhood associations or community forums,
may, of course, increase their roles as a consequence of the increased cost
of using government. While this is generally a good outcome, their capa-
bilities are limited.42 Furthermore, only government can make a legitimate
choice, tax, and compel adherence to its choices. These three powers re-
served to government are critically important in many instances, especially
where issues characterized by deep value conflicts (e.g., protection of mi-
norities) or free-rider dynamics are involved. The mechanisms of account-
ability are simply much better elaborated for government than for non-
governmental institutions of collective action. They include elections, con-
flict of interest provisions, open records, and meeting requirements.
In summary, the less visible, but still direct impacts of fiscal limits
upon governance capacity include: (1) substantial movement to plebis-
catary democracy, especially with passage of Proposition 218 in 1996; and
(2) increased transaction costs imposed upon governments emerging from
the simple number of changes in the fiscal system and increased conflicts
over revenues and expenditures between the state and local governments
and private interests.
-Indirect Impacts of Adaptive Actions
Governmental adaptations to fiscal limits also impact governance ca-
pacity. Governments pursue revenues, make cuts, and devise new strate-
gies for action, and the resulting complexity of governmental action makes
the whole enterprise less intelligible and accountable.
As elaborated above in Figure 1, large adaptations to fiscal limits
have occurred in California. Old devices of public finance have been ex-
panded and new devices invented. New governmental entities have been
created. New relationships have been forged among governments. This se-
ries of adaptations has led, however, to fragmentation of governmental
authority and limitations upon governmental action. For example, county
transportation commissions, devised to provide funding for transportation
infrastructure through voter approved sales tax increases, provided the de-
sired funding and projects but also increased governmental fragmentation,
separating several billions of dollars of revenues annually from the "nor-
41. For example, Proposition 218 requires more elections on fiscal matters. See generally
LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, supra note 19.
42. See, e.g., PUTNAM, supra note 9, at 179-180.
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mal" allocation processes of general purpose governments and remaining
essentially unaccountable to citizens after the initial vote of approval.43
Additionally, the techniques of public finance have become less visi-
ble and understandable to citizens. The transparency of property, income,
and sales taxes generating revenues allocated through an annual budget
process has been complemented with financing and budgetary practices
that are complex and much less visible.
44
Two examples illustrate the general pattern of fiscal adaptation, gen-
erating fragmentation and resulting in reduced visibility, intelligibility, and
accountability. The first example also illustrates the "fiscalization of land
use," where governmental polices affecting land uses are greatly influ-
enced by fiscal factors as opposed to other land use policy goals such as
environmental, esthetic, or traffic circulation values.45 California was
among the first states to innovate with tax increment financing to support
"urban redevelopment," adopting such financing in 1952.46 While avail-
able to counties, over ninety-seven percent of redevelopment activity oc-
curs in cities. 47 Tax increment financing captures the growth in property
tax revenues within boundaries of a redevelopment project, directing them
to the redevelopment authority instead of the city, county, schools and spe-
cial districts which would ordinarily receive the growth, and leaving them
with essentially static base line (adjusted for two percent growth annually)
revenue streams.48 These authorities are established and governed by
elected city officials, but have separate legal standing and fiscal powers.
They afford a vehicle for city action "outside" of traditional city govern-
ment, which is still fully integrated into the city's aspirations, and offer
multiple opportunities for moving funds between the city and the redevel-
opment authority. In 1970, 86 redevelopment agencies existed, with their
number growing to 197 by 1980 and to 399 by 1996 (with a surge of 114
agencies being created between 1981 and 1985). 49
Redevelopment authorities are not only fiscal devices to generate
revenues which can be used for redevelopment projects and to share city
overhead expenses but, also are devices of competition for revenues among
cities. The powers of redevelopment authorities offered new weapons in
the competition for attractive land uses generating large sales tax revenues.
Cities began to compete not only through infrastructure to support devel-
43. See generally PAUL G. LEWIS & MARY SPRAGUE, PUBLIc PoLIcY INSTITrrTE OF
CALIFORNIA, FEDERAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY AND THE ROLE OF METROPOLxrAN PLANNING
ORGANIZATIONS IN CALIFORNIA (1997).
44. See, e.g., Dean J. Misczynski, Financing Infrastructure in Times of Fiscal Fundamen-
talism, in 8 CALIFORNIA POLICY CHOICES 127-150 (John J. Kirlin ed. 1992).
45. See id.
46. See generally MICHAEL DARDIA, PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA,
SUBSIDIZNG REDEVELOPMENT IN CALIFORNIA (1998).
47. See id. at 3.
48. See id. at 4.
49. See generally BEN H. STAIRS, CALIFORNIA REDEVELOPMENT AGENCIES (1996).
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opment, but also by establishing redevelopment tax increment districts in
areas that were not blighted.50 Unfortunately, perceived "abuses" of the
redevelopment authority have since led to increased restriction in state law,
in other words, restrictions on including rural lands in redevelopment proj-
ect boundaries, requirements that increased proportions of the revenues re-
ceived be used for low income housing, and increased "pass throughs" of
increases in property taxes to counties and schools.5 1
A second example is seen in the use of Joint Powers Authorities
("JPA's"), potential vehicles for cooperation among cities.52 Tom Gardner
analyzed use of JPAs in 40 counties, focusing on 114 randomly selected
cases, with only 35 coming into existence before 1975 and 63 since 1985. 53
The reasons for such cooperation after 1980 are largely financial-to share
costs of a large asset or better matching services to appropriate geographi-
cal area-but also include technological factors 4 The operations of such
JPAs are considerably less visible to citizens, however, as they are not di-
rectly accountable to citizens. They are governed by peer-selected local
government officials from participating governments, and are sometimes
augmented by selected staff or citizen representatives.
In short, the indirect effects of adaptations to fiscal limits include di-
minished intelligibility of governmental activities, reduced visibility, and
reduced accountability. The impact upon governance also includes in-
creased transaction costs for governments, citizens, and private interests.
The common result of adaptation is fragmentation of governmental
authorities, competencies and fiscal resources with aspirations for the fu-
ture of communities collectively, of individual property owners, or of a
government requiring joint approval 'and action by multiple governmental
entities for success.
50. See DARDIA, supra note 46, at 25-27.
51. See id.; see also STAIRS, supra note 49.
52. See CAL GOv'T CODE §§ 6500-6598.5 (West Supp. 1998).
53. Thomas M. Gardner, Joint Powers Agencies: Cooperative Structures in California
Local Governments (1992) (unpublished DPA dissertation, University of Southern California)
(on file with the University of Southern California library).
54. See id& at 224.
55. See id. at 257-263.
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